

# ASCAP NEWSLETTER

Across-Species Comparisons And Psychiatry Newsletter

Volume 5, No. 3, 15 Mar 1992 (Cumulative #52)

"Biology is not simply writing information; it is doing something about it...[C]ells are very tiny, but they are very active; they manufacture various substances; they walk around; they wiggle; and they do all kinds of marvelous things."  
Feynman, 1960<sup>1</sup>

The ASCAP Newsletter<sup>2</sup>  
is  
a function of the  
  
International Association  
for the Study of  
Comparative Psychopathology  
(IASCAP)<sup>3</sup>

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Newsletter aims; 1. A free exchange of letters, notes, articles, essays or ideas in whatever brief format.  
2. Elaboration of others' ideas.  
3. Keeping up with productions, events, and other news.  
4. Proposals for new initiatives, joint research endeavors, etc.

IASCAP Mission Statement; The society represents a group of people who view forms of psychopathology in the context of evolutionary biology and who wish to mobilize the resources of various disciplines and individuals potentially involved so as to enhance the further investigation and study of the conceptual and research questions involved. This scientific society is concerned with the basic plans of behavior that have evolved over millions of years and that have resulted in psychopathologically related states. We are interested in the integration of various methods of study ranging from that focusing on cellular processes to that focusing on individuals to that of individuals in groups.

Comment: Our quote above focuses on cells that do things. This issue highlights the psychotherapeutic field that *does* things, but that needs a theoretical basis also. Note John Pearce's letter regarding a Boston area conference announced next page.

Next issue will feature the psychiatrist who pioneered this approach, Aaron Tim Beck, as he presents an set of speculations which he emphasizes are early and tentative. I asked him despite this to provide them to us with the idea that in the best ASCAP spirit, they would provide discussion stimuli from which we can all learn similar to the instruction provided by John Price's July 1990 essay: prominent thinkers with provocative thoughts!

Features: 1) Opioid and serotonin mechanisms in defeat and depression by M Erickson . . . . . p3  
2) Reply to Paul Gilbert and comment on John Price and Michael Chance by J Birtchnell . . . . . p4  
3) Does differing precision in two senses have implications for communicational accuracy? by WD Reichelt & CR Reichelt . . . . . p8

Announcement: Conference on April 9, 1992, at McLean Hospital, Belmont, Massachusetts!

The Cognitive Approach and Evolutionary Biology: Towards a Scientific Basis for Psychotherapy.

Albert Ellis, PhD

Kalman Glantz, PhD

John K Pearce, MD

Moderator: Daniel R. Wilson, MD

Saturday, April 11, 1992, 9 am - 1 pm  
Pierce Hall, McLean Hospital, Belmont, MA (four category I AMA credit hrs). Call (617) 855-3151/3152.

For the first time, this conference will bring together one of the founders of cognitive therapy (Dr Ellis) and the co-authors (Drs Glantz and Pearce) of one of the first books on the evolutionary approach to psychotherapy (*Exiles from Eden: Psychotherapy from an Evolutionary Perspective*).

The current explosion of knowledge in the life sciences is transforming our understanding of the connection between cognition and biology. By integrating scientific developments from the disciplines of psychology, anthropology, ethology and evolutionary biology, this shift in perspective promises to revolutionize psychotherapy.

Albert Ellis will talk about the role of evolutionary concepts in cognitive-behavioral therapy. Kalman Glantz and John Pearce will show why an evolutionary approach to the mind makes it necessary for therapists to address cognition. The three will be presenting innovative treatment interventions and powerful new ways of conceptualizing human problems.

Letters

December 12, 1991

I recently presented a paper on Personality Disorders at the AABT [Association for the Advancement of Behavior Therapy]. There is a long segment at the beginning incorporating some of my ideas regarding the

evolution of Axis I and Axis II disorders. ... January 17, 1992

Thank you for your letter of January 6, which I just received.

I did not have any immediate plans for publishing my remarks to the AABT concerning my views...I primarily wanted to present to an audience that was largely schooled in thinking of learning as the immediate causation of behavior and directing them to a broader perspective. Also, since it was an invited address, I wanted to present something that would be of interest and also somewhat provocative. I am saying this because some of the ideas were speculative and not completely thought through. I am, of course, appreciative of comments from people such as yourself who are better schooled in evolutionary concepts and the literature on that subject.

....In regards to publishing my paper in ASCAP - I am pleased that you consider it important enough to warrant publication. As I have already indicated my thinking in the evolutionary area is still at a fairly primitive state, but if you think that this is advanced enough to warrant preliminary publication, then that's probably a pretty good idea. My own impression is that the paper is probably much too long to get into one of the editions. Also it may have too many tables for that purpose.

Actually, what I presented there represents just a smaller part of my thinking about depression. In a broader context, my notion is that individuals are driven by some sort of program to enhance and protect their resources. In the case of depression, they perceive the loss of a significant valued piece of their resources (such as loss of status in "defeat depression" and loss of a significant other in "deprivation depression." For reasons that are not clear to me, they are unable to draw on other resources in order to prevent the activation of the depres-

sogenic program.

I am taking the liberty of ...[referring to a book written] by Emery and myself on anxiety disorders and phobias.<sup>4</sup> I have made reference to evolutionary theories of anxiety disorders and phobias at many points throughout the book which...[can be located] through the index.

Aaron T Beck, U Penn, Philadelphia

Letters (continued) 19 Feb 1992

Please find attached my reply to Carolyn Reichelt's very challenging response. I very much enjoyed wrestling with it. What it rammed home to me was how little I help myself by inventing my own terminology. It is clear from other responses as well as Carolyn's that I presumed to be proposing a totally new "comparator gene" and, as there is no evidence for this, the effects I attribute to it must be a myth as well. I deal with this in...the attachment [to be published in a future issue].

In [this]...you will see that I am making my usual bold claims. On this occasion it is the resurrection of group selection. If you can drum up another high quality critique, I should be more than grateful.

Mike Waller, Worcestershire, UK

Letters (continued) Feb 22nd, 1992

Enclosed is a draft of a program we are putting on at McLean. Dan Wilson will be the moderator.

Background on the conference: Cognitive theorists rejected the psychoanalytic model of mind because it had little room for cognition. They got along without a theory of mind. Now comes forth the new integration of neuroscience, ethology and evolutionary reasoning--a theory of mind. This is a theory that suits them fine, and is part of current biological science. They are naturally pleased...Aaron Beck...

talked to Albert Ellis and we got a program that we hope will attract lots of interest.

John K Pearce, Cambridge, MA

Letters (continued): 5 Mar 92

I enclose a galley of a paper (Wilson DR: Evolutionary epidemiology Acta Biotheoretica 1992;40 (#1)...

Also, ASCAP readers may wish to know of a McLean symposium cooked up by the "Boston Band" [see announcement]. Albert Ellis of Cognitive Therapy fame read Kalman Glantz and John Pearce's book Exiles from Eden and wrote to them. We got McLean and Harvard Medical School to sponsor "Toward a scientific basis for psychotherapy: The cognitive approach and evolutionary biology" Saturday, April 11. Should be fun. This is - I think - the first clinical CME course (at least here) on Evolution. "Ticket" sales are running well. ...

Daniel R Wilson, McLean Hospital

Opioid and Serotonin Mechanisms in defeat and depression by M Erickson

I recently - somewhat by accident - came across the enclosed articles. I think they have significance for ASCAP's work on depression.

In a '82 Science article mice repeatedly subjected to defeat showed very little response to morphine relative to controls. Repeated defeat seems to effect an endogenously generated tolerance--presumably to endogenous opiates (see abstract).

Mice exposed to repeated attacks by other mice showed decreased nociception in response to radiant heat focused on their tails. This form of analgesia was blocked by centrally acting opiate antagonists and was not observed in morphine tolerant mice; furthermore, mice repeatedly subjected to defeat showed much less analgesia after receiving morphine than mice that were not subjected to defeat. Mice of the CXBK strain, which respond weakly to morphine, displayed only moderate analgesia following defeat. These findings suggest that endogenous

opioid-mediated analgesic mechanisms are readily activated by situations involving biologically significant forms of stress, such as defeat.

A question arises from this: Is the "psychogenic pain" associated with depression secondary to an endogenous down-regulation of the opioid system?

*"findings suggest that endogenous opioid-mediated analgesic mechanisms are readily activated by situations involving biologically significant forms of stress, such as defeat."*

If so, is this adaptive? Is it possible that endogenously generated depressive psychogenic pain has similar effects behavior as does an actual severe wound? The animal seeks the safest possible location and posture to minimize expenditure of energy and to avoid further insult (and maximize healing in the case of a physical wound).

Perhaps Mike McGuire has looked at this, but is it possible that there is some sort of reciprocal relation between the serotonin system and dominance and the opioid system and submission (as in the box below)?

Repeated defeat	depressive sx + opioid activity serotonin activity
Social dominance	elevated mood + opioid activity serotonin activity

A second study from the University of Zurich in Switzerland also bears on this. The abstract follows:<sup>6</sup>

The present work reviews neurochemical, physiological and behavioral data recorded from the attacked mouse and integrates them into a model of coping mechanisms during social conflict. More specifically, the possible relationships between systems of pain, memory and defense are presented, with special emphasis on the role of endogenous opioid peptides (EOPs). In recipients of attack, decreased  $\beta$ -endorphin-like immunoreactivity and changes in opiate and benzodiazepine binding characteristics

are found in structures of the brain defensive system. EOPs mediate the social conflict-induced increase of dopamine synthesis in the periaqueductal grey and frontal cortex. Social conflict analgesia in attacked mice is under the control of central opioid and nonopioid (eg, benzodiazepine, glutamate) mechanisms, and is modified by experience (eg, long-term analgesic reaction; tolerance). EOPs and pain-inhibitory mechanisms participate in the organization of behavioral defense, recuperative behavior and the memory of attack experience. The data are considered in relationship to the perceptual-defensive-recuperative model of fear and pain, forwarded by Bolles and Fanselow.

I want to call this to the attention of you and ASCAP readers quickly, but haven't done a complete literature review. However, although I haven't yet looked them up, it appears that the following citations might be pertinent to this work:

1. Miczek KA, Thompson ML, Shuster L: Analgesia following defeat in an aggressive encounter: development of tolerance and changes in opioid receptors. In Kelly DD (ed): Stress Induced Analgesia. Proc NY Acad of Sci. 1986;467:14-29.
2. Miller LG, Thompson ML, Greenblatt DJ, Deutsch SJ, Shader RJ, Paul S: Rapid increase in brain benzodiazepine receptor binding following defeat stress in mice. Brain Res 1987;414:395-400.
3. Rodgers RJ, Randall JI: Social conflict analgesia: studies on naloxone antagonism and morphine cross-tolerance in male DBA/2 mice. Pharmacol Biochem Behav 1985;23:883-887.

Reply to P Gilbert and comment on J Price and M Chance by J Birtchnell

People's theories are extensions of themselves and should be respected as such. Should I think of my theory as being better or worse than Russ's, John's, Paul's or Michael's, or should I recognise that we are all, in our individual ways, trying to describe the same reality (like the blind men and the elephant)? In this respect theories are like languages and, in the course of these exchanges, we learn to speak each other's language and become able to make translations from one theory

into another. Our theories are different because our interests do not entirely correspond, and although there are areas of overlap, there are also areas which are peculiar to each of us and which fit in better with our particular priorities.

*"I do not consider affective states to be forms of relating"*

I see Paul's statement as a staking out of his territory in order to separate it off from my territory. Whilst I see this as a useful exercise, I would not wish to feel excluded from certain areas which he is claiming as his own. We are both interested in goals and this perhaps is where (to use a rowing term) we appear to be getting into each other's water. His care-eliciting and care-giving goals correspond with my lower-close and upper-close goals, though I would include a lot more besides within these two positions. His cooperation goal is part of my closeness goal, but here again, cooperation is only one aspect of the broader concept of closeness. His competition goal, to some extent, corresponds with my upper-distant goal, but I must add that competition has always struck me as not so much a goal, but more a means of attaining a goal, eg, to elicit care. There are also (using my terminology) close forms of competition (eg, playing cards) and distant forms of competition (eg, a fight to the death.)

Paul lays claim to "the concept of the self" but the self plays an important part in my theory too. One feature of distance is self-centredness and self-preoccupation. If one is not interested in others (closeness) one must be interested in oneself (distance). This corresponds with Derry Macdiarmid's<sup>8</sup> distinction between other-cathexis and self-cathexis. The development of a firm sense of "who or what we are" takes

place in distance.

In paragraph 3 Paul maintains that issues of defence and safety are not addressed in my model, but in paragraph 4, which also concerns these issues, he proposes that our models overlap. The individual (or animal) can feel safe or unsafe in any one of the eight relating positions and may need to defend it against any who may wish to dispossess him/her of it.

It is not entirely true that he and I "came up with the idea that we need a third dimension." Paul is the one who needed a third dimension and his Diagram I is largely to satisfy this need in him. So far as I am concerned there are only two dimensions of relating and all other considerations are qualifiers of these. Being forced unwillingly into a particular relating position by another who needs to have one in that position in not, to my mind, operating within a third dimension. Both participants in this interaction are operating within the same two dimensional system. Also, I made it clear in my reply to Russ that I do not consider affective states to be forms of relating; they are what we feel about gaining, losing or being in danger of losing particular relating positions.

I think that the big difference between Paul and myself, and also I think between Russ, John and Michael and myself, is that I am not interested in identifying the basis for various forms of relating within the central nervous system.

I would like now to turn to John and Michael's piece about "the two modes of social relating." I think it is important to remember that these began as a means of distinguishing between the social behaviour within two types of monkey colony. It remains unclear whether they are in-born characteristics of the two species of monkey or whether they are responses to the different environ-

ments in which the two species habitually live. There is much in what John subsequently writes to suggest that the environment plays an important part in determining which mode is adopted. Hedonic behaviour is a kind of Lotus-Land behaviour where there is no need to compete for resources: the animals trust each other because there is plenty for everyone. Agonic behaviour is a kind of dog eats dog, every man for himself behaviour, consequent upon resources becoming scarce: the animals are in a state of high arousal, ready to grab what they can and fight off competitors. I remember saying to Michael recently that this reminded me of Gibb's<sup>11</sup> distinction between supportive and defensive communication. Supportive communication conveys empathy for the feelings and respect for the worth of the other. Reassurance results when a communication indicates that the person identifies him/herself with the other's problems, shares his feelings and accepts his/her emotional reactions at face value (the hedonic mode). Defensive communication occurs when an individual perceives or anticipates threat in the other. The defending him/herself: s/he thinks about how s/he may avoid or mitigate a perceived or anticipated attack, how s/he may win, dominate, impress or escape punishment. As a person becomes more and more defensive, s/he becomes less able to perceive accurately the motives, values and emotions of the other (the agonic mode).

I think it is important to distinguish between a relationship and relating: A relationship is that which takes place between people and relating is that which one person does to another. My theory is concerned predominantly with relating, though it is possible to speak of two people being close or distant. The agonic\hedonic distinction appears to apply predominantly to societies,

colonies and relationships. Although John maintains that "the term mode should be restricted to relationships" he does write about "an agonic personality" and a man "behaving agonically." Gibb states that defensive communications tend to provoke defensive responses, hence defensive exchanges are common; but it is not impossible for a person to respond supportively to a defensive communication and thus break the vicious circle. I imagine the same can apply to agonic and hedonic exchanges.

*"Hedonic behaviour is a kind of Lotus-Land behaviour where there is no need to compete for resources"*

The agonic/hedonic or defensive/supportive distinction combines two separate distinctions in my own theory: the distance/closeness and the negative relating/positive relating distinctions. In a state of total distance, the person would show no interest in relating at all, but there is a kind of relating which I call distant relating which could best be described as formal. When soldiers are drilling they are engaging in distant relating. The individual counts for nothing (simply cannon fodder). Under such circumstances hierarchies readily develop. Close relating is characterised by informality. People let their hair down and try to get to know each other better (eg, the office party). Under such circumstances hierarchies get broken down. Michael maintains that the agonic mode is the fighting mode and soldiers are certainly trained and prepared for fighting. People under conditions of closeness however wish to be harmonious and peaceful (eg, the flower people). People need to move into distance before they are capable of fighting or killing. Air bombers need to distance themselves from the people they drop bombs on. There appears therefore to be a paral-

lel between the agonic/hedonic and the distance/closeness distinctions.

But this does not account for the arousal/defensive component of the agonic mode, which would correspond with my category of negative relating. The person who is unsure of his/her ability to attain or maintain a particular state of relatedness becomes anxious and desperate. S/he is concerned only with getting what s/he needs and s/he is not too particular about what s/he has to resort to to get it. This is the every man for himself (self-centered) aspect of the agonic mode. The negative relater is no respecter of the other and will, if s/he can, impose (disrespectfully) on him/her, that form of relating which s/he needs. There is no cooperation (hedonic mode) about negative relating and no attempt to find out whether the other would welcome whatever form of relating is being imposed. Positive relating is a much more cooperative enterprise. The positive relater offers or invites a particular form of relating and proceeds with it only if the other seems agreeable. There also therefore appears to be a parallel between the agonic/hedonic and the negative relating/ positive relating distinctions.

*"the agonic mode is a mixture of distance and negative relating and the hedonic mode is a mixture of closeness and positive relating."*

To sum up, perhaps then the agonic mode is a mixture of distance and negative relating and the hedonic mode is a mixture of closeness and positive relating. This puts the agonic/hedonic distinction on a par with the classical interpersonal psychology horizontal dimension of hate (which is both distant and negative) versus love (which is both close and positive). I have often been struck, in the writing of both Michael and John, by the prepon-

derance of thinking in terms of the vertical dimension (upperness and lowerness). It may be therefore that they have at least partially accommodated the horizontal dimension (closeness and distance) within their agonic/hedonic distinction.

John proposes that the difference between an agonic and a hedonic relationship is that in a hedonic relationship there is no dispute about the "definition of the relationship." Either one partner defines it and the other accepts it or the definition is agreed by mutual negotiation. In an agonic relationship there is dispute. By "definition" he means an understanding about which partner has the upper hand for; in my terminology, he seems concerned only with the upperness-lowerness dimension. From my understanding of the two modes I would not have considered that they differed in this way. Be this as it may, similarity does exist between this process of accepting or agreeing about the "definition" and the difference I have just described between negative and positive relating.

John frequently writes about switching from one mode to the other. In terms of "defining" the relationship, presumably he means that the partners stop or start accepting or agreeing about its "definition;" or, in interpersonal psychology terms, moving between love and hate. Going right back to our considerations of monkey colonies, I would have thought that one cause of switching would be a change in the availability of resources. When they are plentiful, the hedonic mode predominates, when they become scarce there is a switch to the agonic mode. In terms of my theory, the equivalent of resources would be the commodity of a particular form of relating. A switch between closeness and distance might be due to having had enough of one or to being pushed too much in one direc-

tion. A switch between positive and negative relating would be a response to the danger of losing one. When say, there is a danger of losing closeness the person becomes anxious and desperate and switches from positively to negatively close behaviour, i.e. from being calmly confident of the other's love to being clinging, seeking reassurance and trying to look more attractive.

John asks, do we call a relationship either agonic or hedonic or do we say it is more one than the other? He comes out in favour of a categorical distinction. With my octagonal assessment I do not have this problem because I score people positively and negatively on each of the eight positions. This reflects reality: within a relationship a person can be negative in some respects and positive in others, close in some respects and distant in others. Our classifications and our measurements should take account of this. I suspect that there is nothing either-or about the agonic/hedonic distinction but that there is some of each in every relationship.

Does differing precision in two senses have implications for communicational accuracy? by WD Reichelt & CR Reichelt

*Homo sapiens* has developed the auditory sense as a communicational device in a especially unique way. We use the spoken word, both in its meaning and its delivery—force, tone, and duration—as our primary means of communication. Psychiatry in particular places enormous emphasis on verbal expression for information gathering and as a therapeutic tool. Indeed, psychoanalysis has focused nearly exclusively upon it, reducing eye contact between therapist and patient to a minimum.

Given our interest in bauplan issues, do we place too much emphasis

on the importance of data gathering through the auditory sense? We make dutiful nods in the direction of the other communicational modalities, but we sense that our hearts aren't in it—and that may place arbitrary and unnecessary limits on our understanding of human communication. We might be wise to look more closely at the role and acuity of other means of data transmission.

*"Vocal verbal communication is a recently evolved layer in the system of basic plans"*

Vocal verbal communication is a recently evolved layer in the system of basic plans; it is unique to us amongst animals. In view of the relative newness of the method and the degree to which our other behaviors are shaped by more ancient layers of the basic plans, perhaps we may legitimately wonder about the true role of individual senses in human communication. Perhaps other, more ancient, communicational modalities are more influential than we fully appreciate. As Sebeok, Hayes, and Bateson pointed out in 1964, humans communicate through means other than language and these other nonlinguistic processes will strongly affect the way we understand verbal communications.<sup>12</sup> Given that fact, perhaps we should apply it to our concerns.

There may be a very good, but less recognized, reasons for continued substantial human reliance on nonlinguistic processes: it is possible that there may be a significant difference in the relative precision of the senses, particularly auditory and visual. If so, is it possible that such differences in acuity may affect the way we understand communications, verbal and other? For the sake of illustration, we'll focus on two art forms: music and printmaking.

All that we take into our minds for

processing enters in the form of sense data; that is, it comes to us through the senses. The data is constructed...organized in some way. Performed music is received as sound data organized in the frequencies of sound waves. Visual art is an organization of color and spatial data that we experience through the auspices of light waves. Thus, the artist or musician presents us with an integrated whole. We as individuals experience the artistic product differently, one from another, and interpret it differently, in accordance with its resonance in our personal history. However, if we were to break down the piece of art to its most basic components (above the molecular level) and ask individuals to identify those parts, we might find an interesting degree of imprecision. If we were to listen to Neil Young perform Sugar Mountain and then were required to listen to it again note by note, very few of us, even with hearing within the limits accepted as normal, could identify the notes with precision: b flat, c sharp, and so on. Only the

*"Color blindness is pathology; poor note discrimination is the norm."*

rare gifted individuals who possess absolute pitch could pass such a test *without seeing the score* an important point to which we'll return later. The emotional impact of the music will vary greatly between people and so will the ability to identify the components. But if most of us who have vision within the accepted parameters of normal were to visit the magnificent exhibition of Jasper Johns lithographs and screen prints that we enjoyed at the Denver Art Institute recently and were asked to describe the components in the collages, we could do so quite easily, despite the rich and complex layering

of colors and materials. Newsprint is newsprint to anyone with reasonable vision acuity; red grease crayon is red (although we may not be artistically sophisticated enough to recognize the medium), blue is blue, grays and blacks are readily identifiable as such. Subtle shadings and variations are describable on demand. The emotional impact will vary markedly between people; the ability to distinguish components much less.

In other words, we offer the suggestion that there is greater congruence in our ability to process visual stimuli precisely than auditory communication (music, spoken work, etc) is less exact than our ability to perceive accurately the frequencies in visual communication (art, written words, facial and bodily expression). Color blindness is pathology; poor note discrimination is the norm. The average individual can distinguish whether notes are higher or lower than one another; he cannot exactly identify individual notes...unless he can read music. . .*unless he has visual cues to help him.*

Since our primary communicational tool relies on that same sense that is somewhat less reliable in musical matters for most of us, even though it is enormously effective emotionally when we process musical sense data, we wonder if the restricted acuity may cause us to miss critical nuances in verbal communications. Are we perhaps hindered a bit in our ability to make fine distinctions about what is being communicated? Are there restraints on our ability to fully and accurately process verbal communications based on the relative imprecision of the auditory sense as compared to the visual. How much is our accurate processing of the spoken word amplified by visual cues? Other primates use olfactory and tactile cues, besides auditory and visual, depending on what works best in the

particular ecological setting in which the species lives. For every good environmental reasons, arboreal species like the howler monkey vocalize a lot, but terrestrial and semi-terrestrial primates tend to be primarily nonvocal, preferring visual and olfactory communications--a provocative thought, since we don't navigate in treetops very well. According to Altmann, "Mammals in general, and primates in particular, make extensive use of multisensory constellations of information inputs."<sup>13</sup>

We suggest that additional attention to more primitive communicational behaviors than the (possibly) imprecise verbal has the potential to be productive. After all, we've all played the kids' game of whispering a story from one person to another around a circle. The tale changes

*"there is no universal spoken human language, only a visual one"*

r-  
emarkably from first teller to last.

Is that phenomenon partially explained by our dependence on limitations in the auditory sense? Indeed, folk wisdom may speak to the value of other modalities because we have a saying for the problem: "I don't see what your driving at!"

A striking example of the importance of other communicational modes may be our ability to determine our place in the social hierarchy by visual means. Other species communicate information through various modalities in order to gain power and adaptive advantage. Visual communications for this purpose are far more frequent than auditory; size, posture, color change, etc. Animals certainly may use sound, but it is usually only part of a whole constellation of display behaviors. So it is with humans. The ability to speak is unique and primary, but it carries with it imprecision and the danger of

misunderstanding. Further, there is no universal spoken human language, only a visual one: happiness, sadness, anger are recognizable on faces throughout the world.

The hypothesis that medical students recalling a triumph would draw themselves larger than when recalling a defeat was upheld; Russell is interested in issues of "bigness" and reports that manics draw themselves larger, more expansively than did a control group of normals. Bush and Saddam took care to appear relaxed, confident, in control during the recent unpleasantness. In the USA, we historically have elected the taller of the presidential candidates (it would be interesting to know if that has increased in frequency since photographs of the candidates have been published). Nixon's loss of the presidency to Kennedy was certainly influenced far more by a visual image in the famous debate than by his command of the information. Depressed individuals communicate submission posturally, as does the subordinate wolf. This is a short list indeed, but it speaks to the point.

So what is more critical, verbal or visual communication? Perhaps neither; undoubtedly the senses complement one another. Certainly, we should pay more attention to that complementarity than we presently see in the newsletter. If IASCAP leads to cross-cultural research (as we surely hope it does), we wonder if the protocol(s) should not at least include some method of eliciting visual data, rather than focusing in too limited a manner on verbal communication. We suggest that we may not be as precisely equipped to process auditory stimuli as visual and that we may rely on the latter more than realize. As a result, it is to our advantage to consider that possibility in our deliberations.

1. Feynman R: Getting even smaller. Excerpt from Engineering and Science. Feb 1960, reprinted in Science 1991;254:1301
  2. c/o R Gardner, 1.200 Graves Building (D29), University of Texas Medical Branch, Galveston, TX 77550 FAX: 409-772-4288. For ASCAP Newsletter Volume 4 (Jan through Dec, 1991) please send \$18 (or equivalent) for the 12 issues. For subscription to the ASCAP Newsletter, make checks or money orders out to "Department of Psychiatry and Behavioral Sciences, UTMB."
  3. EXECUTIVE COUNCIL:  
President: Michael R A Chance  
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Vice President: Paul Gilbert  
Secretary & Newsletter Editor: Russell Gardner, Jr  
Treasurer: Leon Sloman
- At this time this "informal" organization has no official budget.
4. Beck AT, Emery G, Greenberg RL: Anxiety Disorders and Phobias: A Cognitive Perspective NY: Basic Books, 1985
  5. Miczek KA, Thompson ML, Shuster L: Opioid-like analgesia in defeated mice. Science 1982,-215:1520-1522
  6. Siegfried B, Frischknecht H-R, de Souza RLN: An ethological model for the study of activation and interaction of pain, memory and defensive systems in the attacked mouse. Role of endogenous opioids. Neuroscience and Biobehavioral Review 1990;14:481-490
  7. Gilbert P: Response to RG and John Birtchnell. ASCAP Newsletter 1992;5(#1):2-6
  8. Macdiarmid D: Self-cathexis and other-cathexis: Vicissitudes in the history of an observation. British Journal of Psychiatry. 1989;154:844-852.
  9. Birtchnell J: John Birtchnell's reply to R Gardner. ASCAP Newsletter 1991;4(#12):10-14
  10. Price J, Chance M: Consensus statement on two modes of social relating, hedonic and agonistic. ASCAP Newsletter 1991;4#10:4-10
  11. Gibb JR: Defensive communication. The Journal of Communication. 1961;11:141-148.
  12. Sebeok TA, Hayes AS, and Bateson MC: Approaches to semiotics. The Hague: Mouton, 1964.
  13. Altmann SA: Social Communication among Primates Chicago and London: U Chicago Press, 1967